Is psychiatric research scientific? by Cooper, Rachel
 1 
This is an author’s version of a chapter published in Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience. 











Lots of people want to know whether psychiatric research is scientific (eg Cawley 1993; Reznek 
1991; Faust and Ziskin 1988; Chur-Hansen and Parker 2005). Opinions vary and tempers flare but 
most participants in the debates have taken two points for granted: First, all assume that asking 
whether psychiatric research can be scientific is a reasonable question to ask. Second, all take it that 
whether or not psychiatric research is scientific matters. In this chapter I contest both these claims. 
 
I start by reviewing the work of those philosophers of science who sought a ‘demarcation criterion’ 
that would distinguish science from non-science. Philosophers of science now generally agree that 
the search for a demarcation criterion has failed. However, in other disciplines the search for a 
means of distinguishing science from pseudoscience continues. I review the current debate in 
psychology and psychiatry. Then, returning to philosophical work, I discuss and support accounts 
according to which ‘science’ is best considered a family resemblance term. This suggests that 
whether psychiatric research is scientific may be a fuzzy matter, and that psychiatric science might 
be like more paradigmatic sciences in some respects but unlike them in others. Instead of asking 
whether psychiatric research is scientific, we would do better to ask more specific questions, such 
as: What are the forms of explanation used in psychiatry? Are they like those used in other 
sciences? Are mental disorders natural kinds? Can psychiatric theory be reduced to more 
fundamental theories?  
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Furthermore, as ‘psychiatric research’ is diverse, these questions may themselves be too broad - 
different areas of psychiatric research plausibly use different forms of explanation, some types of 
mental disorder may be natural kinds while others are not, and so on. In general the best questions 
to ask will be very particular. Instead of asking whether psychiatric research is scientific, we should 
ask questions like: Given what we know about schizophrenia does it seem to be a natural kind? 
Might cognitive theories of autism be reduced to theories that posit neurological problems?  
 
Finally, I shall briefly consider why it is that the question of whether psychiatry is a science is so 
popular. If the question is malformed, what accounts for its enduring appeal? 
 
The remainder of the chapter falls into the following sections: 
1. Work on demarcation in philosophy. 
2. The debate in psychology and psychiatry. 
3.  Returning to philosophy - ‘Science’ as a family resemblance term 
4. Asking better questions  
5. Demanding higher epistemic standards across the board. 
6. Why have people wanted to know whether psychiatry is a science? 
 
1. Work on demarcation within philosophy 
 
When considering philosophical work on the demarcation problem we should start with the work of 
Karl Popper (1963). Karl Popper was one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century and 
wrote extensively on demarcation. Popper was greatly impressed by the physics of his time, and 
sceptical of other popular contemporary theories, in particular Freudian psychoanalysis. Popper 
sought a criterion that would demarcate the theories of physics from those of psychoanalysis, and 
more generally distinguish science from pseudoscience. In his theory of falsification Popper thought 
he had found what he was looking for. According to Popper, scientific theories are those that can be 
falsified – that is if they are false it is possible for this to be revealed by empirical evidence. 
Pseudoscientific theories, on the other hand, are not falsifiable – whatever happens the theory will 
be able to come up with some explanation. 
 
Using his criterion of falsifiability, Popper classified the theories of relativity theory as science and 
those of psychoanalysis as pseudoscience. Let’s take relativity theory first: Relativity theory can be 
used to make highly specific predictions, for example it predicts that the light from the stars should 
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be bent by the mass of the sun. During a solar eclipse it is possible to measure this bending, and, as 
it happens the observed effect fits with that predicted. For Popper, the noticeable thing about 
relativity theory is that it commits itself to making specific empirical claims. In doing this it runs 
the risk of being shown wrong by events. The theory is falsifiable and so counts as science 
according to Popper. On the other hand, Popper claims psychoanalysts have an answer for every 
eventuality – if an analysand accepts an interpretation then it’s proved right, but if they deny it the 
analyst can simply excuse this by saying that they are in denial. As Popper thinks that 
psychoanalysis cannot be proved wrong, he considers it to be unfalsifiable and so pseudoscience. 
 
Popper’s demarcation criterion is still widely discussed in medical and lay debates about the 
scientific status of psychiatry and psychoanalysis (for example, Grant and Harari 2005), but has 
now largely been abandoned by philosophers. Philosophers have rejected Popper’s demarcation 
criterion because it runs into various well-known problems, perhaps the greatest of which is the 
Quine-Duhem problem (a similar if not identical problem is also sometimes known as ‘the 
experimenters’ regress’) (Duhem 1954, Quine 1961, Collins and Pinch 1993). The problem is that 
theories only make concrete predictions in concert with various auxiliary hypotheses. Popper says 
that scientists should come up with theories and then see if experiments falsify them. However 
when an unexpected observation is made, although this might be because the theory is false, it 
might be because something has gone wrong elsewhere - maybe some part of the experimental 
apparatus has broken, or maybe the statistics have been analysed incorrectly. Even when all 
imaginable sources of error have been checked out the theory may still actually be true in spite of 
the results not being as expected. This is because in some cases factors that are as yet unknown 
might be interfering with the results.  
 
A consequence of the Quine-Duhem problem is that a theory can never be conclusively falsified. 
When an experiment gives an unexpected result the problem may always lie somewhere other than 
the theory.  Popper knew about the Quine-Duhem problem and modified his account to deal with it. 
He says that good scientists should agree before an experiment which auxiliary hypotheses they will 
check if they face an unexpected result (so, they agree to check the wires haven’t fallen off and to 
repeat any statistical analyses, but they don’t resort to positing that unknown factors are interfering 
with their results) (Popper 1959 §20). However, Popper’s modified account is much less attractive 
than the simple criterion of falsification. With the modifications, distinguishing between science 
and pseudoscience is no longer a simple matter. It no longer depends simply on the question of 
whether a theory makes empirical predictions that might turn out to be false, but also on whether the 
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practitioners have the correct ‘scientific’ outlook – whether they only check auxiliary hypotheses to 
an extent that is ‘reasonable’. 
 
Of course, other philosophers of science have proposed demarcation criteria apart from Popper. 
Perhaps most influentially Thomas Kuhn suggested that a field becomes a science when it finds its 
first ‘paradigm’ (1970). A Kuhnian paradigm is a commonly agreed framework for doing research 
in some area. Scientists who share a paradigm will agree on the questions that should be addressed, 
on the methods that should be used, and on what counts as good research in some area. Once a field 
has found its first paradigm scientists in that area can begin to do ‘normal science’ – that is puzzle 
solving within the taken for granted framework of the paradigm. So, physicists working within the 
paradigm of Newtonian mechanics, for example, can spend time worrying about how to apply the 
laws of mechanics to collisions involving multiple bodies or the flow of liquids, but they never 
question the fundamental correctness of the Newtonian framework. The puzzle solving that is 
characteristic of normal science practiced within a paradigm is of central importance for Kuhn 
because it is what enables a science to make progress. 
 
Kuhn’s demarcation criterion is also inadequate, however. As Paul Feyerabend points out, puzzle 
solving within some commonly accepted framework is not solely characteristic of science (1970). 
For example organised crime shares this feature – once a criminal mastermind has come up with 
something that works, other criminals content themselves with developing variations on the theme. 
Similarly, theologians, and philosophers working within particular schools, work on intellectual 
puzzles set out within a particular intellectual tradition.  
 
2. The debate in psychology and psychiatry 
 
Philosophers have now fairly much given up on demarcating science from pseudoscience, but the 
demarcation problem remains a live issue in other areas of the academy. In psychology in 
particular, a large body of work addresses the issue of what it is that makes work scientific or 
pseudoscientific. In recent years a number of writers within psychology have become concerned 
that psychology is being brought into disrepute by practitioners who engage in pseudoscience. 
Some worry about the range of dubious therapies that are now offered to the public (Lilienfeld, 
Lynn and Lohr 2003).Others think that the debates over Multiple Personality Disorder, the detection 
of child abuse, and the possibility of recovered memories, are suspect and have led the field into 
crisis (Tavris 2004). 
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These concerns have led to an attempt within psychology to identify science and pseudoscience and 
to cleanse psychology of its more dubious theories and practitioners: A number of books on this 
theme have been published, most notably Lilienfeld, Lynn and Lohr’s (2003) Science and 
Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology;  a new journal, The Scientific Review of Mental Health 
Practice (SRMHP), has been set up with the explicit  aim of distinguishing the scientific wheat 
from the pseudoscientific chaff in clinical psychology, psychiatry and allied disciplines; there have 
been calls for psychology undergraduates to be taught courses that will help them to distinguish 
science from pseudoscience (Lilienfeld, Lohr and Morier 2001). 
 
In contrast to the earlier philosophical attempts at demarcation, in the psychological literature most 
writers have not sought to define science or pseudoscience in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Rather writers have tended to provide lists of criteria that make a field more or less 
scientific. These lists are highly reminiscent of the lists of symptoms that are used to identify 
psychopathology. In the same sort of way that a patient with a number of depressive symptoms is 
considered more likely to suffer from depression, a field that shows a number of specified signs is 
considered more likely to be a pseudoscience. 
 
Different writers provide various different lists of the symptoms of pseudoscience and science. 
Tavris (2003) notes that in contrast with pseudoscience, sciences tend to characterised by a 
willingness to question received wisdom, and rely on gathering empirical evidence to determine 
whether a prediction or belief is valid. In addition she notes that scientific claims tend to be 
falsifiable in Popper’s sense. 
 
Lilienfeld, Lohr and Morier (2001, p.182) provide a longer list of criteria. They think that the 
difference between science and pseudoscience in a difference of degree rather than kind, but think 
that pseudoscientific claims often have a number of markers. 
 
Among these characteristics are (a) unfalsifiability (Popper, 1959), (b) absence of self-correction 
(Herbert et al., in press), (c) overuse of ad hoc immunizing tactics designed to protect theories from 
refutation (Lakatos,1978), (d) absence of ‘connectivity’ (Stanovich, 1998, p.116) with other domains 
of knowledge (i.e., failure to build on extant scientific constructs; Bunge, 1967), (e) the placing of the 
burden of proof on critics rather than on the proponents of claims (Shermer, 1997), (f) the use of 
obscurantist language (i.e., language that seems to have as its primary function to confuse rather 
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than clarify; Hockenbury & Hockenbury, 1999; van Rillaer, 1991), and (g) overreliance on anecdotes 
and testimonials at the expense of systematic evidence (Herbert et al., 2000).
1
 
The point of such lists is to enable pseudoscience to be identified and done away with, and indeed a 
number of papers have used such lists to condemn specific practices as pseudoscientific. For 
example, Herbert, Lilienfeld, Lohr et al (2000) examine the technique of ‘Eye Movement 
Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) a supposed treatment for anxiety disorders. They spot 
the symptoms of pseudoscience and thus dismiss the technique. Similarly, papers in Lilienfeld, 
Lynn and Lohr’s (ed) (2003) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology use lists of criteria 
that make a field pseudoscientific in their attempt to root out dubious therapies.  
Distinguishing scholarly research from rubbish is important. However, I shall argue that it is a 
mistake to try and diagnose pseudoscience in way analogous to the way that a clinician diagnoses 
psychopathology. Looking at Lilienfeld, Lohr and Morier’s criteria I have several worries. Firstly, it 
is unclear how the criteria are to be weighted: Is obscure language as big a sin as unfalsifiability? 
How is a reliance on anecdotes to be weighted against an absence of ‘connectivity’? 
 
My more serious worry is that considered individually each of the criteria is insufficient to indicate 
that a discipline has problems. Depending on the context, unfalsifiability, or obscure language, or 
meeting any of the other criteria may not be indicative of pseudoscience. I will show this by 
considering each criterion in turn. 
 
a. Unfalsifiability – as mentioned earlier the Quine-Duhem problem means that conclusive 
falsification is always very difficult (if not impossible). In addition, as pointed out by Larry 
Laudan, certain statements that are surely scientific are not candidates for falsification. In 
                                                 
1 In a later book Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Pyschology (2003) Lilienfled, Lynn and Lohr present the 
same list of criteria but also add: 
 
h. evasion of peer review (2003, p. 6) 
i. emphasis on confirmation rather than refutation (p.7) 
j. absence of boundary conditions – they claims that ‘most well-supported scientific theories possess boundary 
conditions, that is, well-articulated limits under which predicted phenomena do an do not apply (p.9) 
k. the mantra of holism ‘proponents of pseudoscientific claims…typically maintain that scientific claims can be 
evaluated only within the context of broader claims and therefore cannot be judged in isolation’ (p.9) 
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particular many existential statements are unfalsifiable. For example, ‘There was a missing 
link between apes and humans’, ‘There are black holes’. (Laudan 1996 p.218). 
b. Absence of self-correction – sometimes a field will not self-correct because it is right – 
thus geometrical optics has not progressed for centuries. 
c. Overuse of ad hoc revisions – this criterion is of little use for spotting pseudoscience. 
Revisions will only be considered to be ‘over-used’ and ‘ad hoc’ if they are independently 
considered problematic. 
d. Absence of ‘connectivity’ – many scientifically accepted phenomena cannot be connected 
into a satisfactory world theory because there is as yet no understanding of how they occur. 
For example, there as yet there is no commonly accepted way of making sense of EPR 
correlations in quantum mechanics. 
e. Placing the burden of proof on critics – oddly this criterion conflicts with (a) 
unfalsifiability. The falsificationist thinks that a scientist should be free to propose any 
hypothesis so long as it has empirically testable consequences, and that the task of science is 
then to seek to demonstrate the falsity of the theory. In lay terms, Popper’s theory of 
falsificationism places the burden of proof on critics! 
f. Use of obscurantist language – again this criterion is of little use – whether language is 
considered ‘obscurantist’ or of ‘necessary theoretical complexity’ depends on whether one 
considers the theory plausible or not. 
g. Over reliance on anecdotes and testimonials – Again, only someone who considers a 
theory problematic will think that it displays an ‘over-reliance’ on single case studies. 
Depending on the question, the use of single case studies may be appropriate. Although a 
single case study is seldom sufficient to show that an effect will always, or even normally, 
occur, it often will be adequate for showing that something is possible. Take for example, 
the much reported single case of D.F. – the woman who can guide her hand through a 
vertical or horizontal slot without having conscious awareness of the slot’s orientation 
(Goodale and Milner 1996). This single case is sufficient to make it conceivable that vision 
for action and for recognition can come apart. 
 
I conclude that each of the seven criteria fails when considered individually. At this Lilienfeld and 
colleagues may not be too distressed. Their criteria are not intended to offer a fool-proof way of 
spotting pseudoscience when considered individually, but are instead taken to be diagnostic of a 
problem when they co-occur in a particular field. Similarly, sadness when considered alone may not 
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be indicative of depression but if it lasts for a considerable time and co-occurs with psychomotor 
retardation and sleep-problems then it suggests that there is a problem. 
 
However, claiming that pseudoscience is only to be suspected when a certain number, say four, of 
the seven criteria are met will not do. I will argue that in some cases a claim may not meet any 
criteria and yet still plausibly be ‘pseudoscientific’. Conversely, in other cases a claim may meet 




Lilienfeld et al’s criteria give rise to false negatives. 
In some cases we may want to consider a claim pseudoscience even though it fails to meet any of 
the seven criteria. Consider the field of ufology – the study of UFOs. Some practitioners in the field 
are keen to meet standards of scientific acceptability. They publish in peer-reviewed journals, avoid 
obscure language, and pride themselves in seeking to test their claims empirically and applying 
standard statistical tests of significance (Cross 2004). Let’s suppose that an ufologist is 
investigating the trauma that can be suffered by ‘alien abductees’. The researcher suspects that 
different types of alien have different types of transport and are differentially likely to harm 
abductees. Such a researcher may come up with the following hypothesis: 
 
People who have been abducted by UFOs with flashing lights are more likely to suffer post-
abduction trauma than those who are abducted by UFOs with constant lights. 
 
The ufologist’s hypothesis is not obscure. It is falsifiable. The ufologist may seek to assess the 
claim empirically, for example by studying a sample of abductees and examining whether there is a 
statistically significant correlation between reports of flashing lights and trauma. Keen to adhere to 
the standards of scientific acceptability the ufologist may send the resulting paper off to an 
appropriate peer-review journal – The Journal of UFO Studies, say.  
 
The ufologist fails to meet Lilienfeld et al’s criteria for pseudoscience. And, yet, I suggest, the odds 
are that they are a crank. The fundamental problem isn’t methodological, however. The basic 
problem is that a fundamental assumption on which their research is based – that aliens frequently 
come to earth – is highly unlikely to be true. As the methods employed by ufologists are similar to 
those used by reputable scientists and yet ufology is a paradigmatic example of pseudoscience,  I 
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conclude that displaying Lilienfeld et al’s hallmarks of science is not sufficient to render a field 
scientific. 
 
Lilienfeld et al’s criteria give rise to false positives. 
Conversely, some claims that we’d normally consider scientifically respectable meet several of 
Lilienfeld et al’s criteria for pseudoscience. Consider the following claim: 
 
There are brocken spectres. 
 
Brocken spectres are rare phenomena. They sometimes occur when a mountaineer gets above the 
clouds and their shadow is cast on the clouds below creating the appearance of a spectre. The claim 
‘There are brocken spectres’ is unfalsifiable (if I go looking for a broken spectre and don’t see any 
this doesn’t mean that they don’t occur). The language is somewhat obscure. The evidence for the 
existence of brocken spectres is anecdotal and testimonial. There is an ‘absence of self-correction’. 
At least until it was discovered what caused brocken spectres there was an ‘absence of connectivity’ 
with other scientific claims. And yet brocken spectres do occur, and the claim is scientifically 
respectable despite the fact that it displays many of Lilienfeld et al’s signs of pseudoscience. 
Applying Lilienfeld et al’s criteria gives rise to false positives. 
 
 
We have already seen that Lilienfeld et al’s criteria cannot distinguish science from pseudoscience 
when applied singly. Now we have seen that they cannot distinguish science from pseudoscience 
when applied in concert either.  
 
 
3. Returning to philosophy:  Science as a family resemblance term 
 
Recent philosophical work presents a picture of the distinction between science and pseudoscience 
that is somewhat similar to that presented in the psychological literature. In philosophy too, 
attempts to define ‘science’ and ‘pseudoscience’ in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions 
have been largely abandoned. Here, though, the similarity ends. Philosophers and psychologists 
tend to draw quite different consequences from the idea that ‘science’ cannot be precisely defined. 
Psychologists have sought to use lists of possible symptoms to diagnose pseudoscience. 
Philosophers have tended to conclude that seeking to demarcate science from pseudoscience is a 
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mistake. Here I examine in greater detail recent literature from the philosophy and history of 
science and then ask why it is that the projects of psychologists and philosophers have diverged. 
 
Recently a number of philosophers of science have suggested that seeking a demarcation criterion is 
misguided. Rather than it being possible to define ‘science’ in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, these philosophers suggest that ‘science’ is best conceived of as a family resemblance 
term (Dupré 1993, Pickstone 2000) in the sense introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the 
Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein asks us to consider what games have in common. He 
suggests that there is no one feature that they all share. Many games are competitive, but some are 
not (ring-a-ring-a-roses). Some games are fun, but others are not (I Spy is quite dull). Many have 
rules, but some don’t (playing cops and robbers). Most involve other people, but some can be 
played alone (patience). Wittgenstein concludes that: 
 
if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships and a whole series of them at that…I can think of no better way to characterise 
these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances of a family: 
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same 
way – And I shall say: games form a family (1953: §66) 
 
Similarly, the various sciences can be seen as forming a family. There is no one feature that they all 
share, but rather a network of resemblances unites them. Many sciences make predictions, but 
others do not. Some posit unobservable entities, some do not. Some, but not all, involve 
experiments. The claim that there is no one feature that all sciences have in common is made all the 
more plausible then we consider the wide range of activities that are classed as ‘science’ The 
activities of theoretical physicists, evolutionary biologists, natural historians, game theorists, 
epidemiologists, neuropsychologists, and materials scientists all get classed as scientific. However 
plausibly there is no one feature that all these areas share.  
 
John Pickstone’s (2000) Ways of Knowing develops the thesis that there are many different types of 
scientific activity. Different sciences in different times seek to understand the world in different 
ways. Some sciences have depended on natural history – the describing and classification of things. 
Others have focussed an analysis – looking within phenomena and breaking them down to 
fundamental elements. Others have learnt through experiment – they have sort to control 
phenomena and to create novelties. Pickstone thinks that methods come to be used in different areas 
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at different times, and that the importance of the different methods varies with subject and period. 
Looking to the future he expects new methods to become available – he cites simulation as a 
method that may hold future promise. 
 
Pickstone’s picture of science stresses the diversity of the activities that we consider ‘scientific’. 
Arguing along similar lines, Larry Laudan concludes that, 
 
The evident epistemic heterogeneity of the activities and beliefs customarily regarded as 
scientific should alert us to the probable futility of seeking an epistemic version of a 
demarcation criterion (1996 p.221) 
 
What’s more, such a view also brings out that the same methods that are used within the sciences 
can also be used in fields that we would not normally class as ‘sciences’. Consider the skills used to 
analyse statistical data – the same skills of sampling and extrapolation are needed by the market 
researcher, or the ecologist, or in social science. Similarly the skills of the natural historian – 
collecting and classifying – can be employed by those who order collections of beetles, as well as 
by those who order collections of wine.  
 
One moral that I think we can draw from this picture of science is that asking whether a field is 
scientific will seldom be the right question to ask. As Pickstone shows us, the methods that are used 
in the sciences are often also employed elsewhere, and whether a field gets counted as ‘science’ or 
not often depends on contingent historical factors. Thus, instead of asking ‘Is psychiatric research 
scientific?’, we would do better to ask questions like ‘What methods have been used in addressing 
the research question?’ and ‘Are these methods generally reliable and appropriate in the case at 
hand?’. 
 
Writing in the psychological literature, McNally has drawn much the same conclusion. As he puts 
it,  
 
Rather than asking, Is this pseudoscience or genuine science? we should ask, What 
arguments and evidence support this clinical claim? We should be concerned with belief-
worthiness, epistemic warrant, evidential basis, empirical support (pick your favourite 
locution), rather than attempting to determine whether the theory or practice falls on the 
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proper side of a demarcation criterion that separates science from pseudoscience’  McNally 
2003 p.4 
 
4. Asking better questions 
 
I conclude that science is a family resemblance term and that asking whether psychiatric research is 
scientific is thus not a very useful question. Rather than asking whether psychiatry is a science we 
would do better to ask finer grained questions: What methods does psychiatry use to explain and 
predict phenomena? Are these methods generally reliable? Are they appropriately applied in 
psychiatry? What’s more, although these questions are better questions than asking ‘Is psychiatric 
research scientific?’ we would do yet better to get yet finer-grained. Psychiatry is a diverse field – 
the sorts of questions that research psychiatrists ask and the methods that they employ vary wildly 
across different areas. Consider, the sorts of research that are published in psychiatry journals  
 
 Randomised Controlled Trials to test drugs and psychological treatment efficacy 
 
 Papers that compare rates of disorder with other factors and examine, for example, whether 
place of residence, or drug abuse, increases the risk of disorder 
 
 Papers that assess patient satisfaction with facilities 
 
 Papers that look at the physiological, or neuropsychological, or cognitive correlates of 
disorder. 
 
 Brain imaging studies 
 
 Cluster-analytic studies 
 
 Studies that assess whether diagnostic criteria can be reliably applied. 
 
And, of course, this list is not exhaustive. It merely acts as a reminder of the range of research 
conducted by psychiatrists. The methods used by research psychiatrists are diverse. Some of the 
methods used are similar to those used in other disciplines. So, for example, the statistical methods 
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employed in RCTS were originally developed for comparing seed varieties and fertilisers in 
agriculture. The methods used in cluster analysis were first used by biologists – especially 
bacteriologists. Other methods may be unique to psychiatry. 
 
Depending on the methods employed, different questions may be asked about the research at issue. 
Some questions will be largely empirical or mathematical – for example determining how large a 
sample needs to be before statistical methods will yield robust results. Others questions about 
methods may be philosophical. For example, the methodology used in RCTs commits one to certain 
views about the foundations of probability theory, and whether these assumptions are acceptable is 
a question that is explored by philosophers (amongst others) (Ashcroft 2004). As another example, 
elsewhere I have argued that certain interpretations of cluster analytic studies commit one to certain 
views about the nature of properties (Cooper 2005). The sociology and history of science also have 
work to do if we want to know which methods are likely to produce reliable results under which 
circumstances. For example, the history of psychiatry shows us that new treatments have often been 
introduced by over-enthusiastic proponents, and that the reports of the initial users of a treatment 
cannot be relied on for assessing treatment efficacy.  
 
Not only are the methods that psychiatrists employ diverse, so too are the conditions that they 
research: Some psychiatric research examines genetically caused disorders like Down’s Syndrome. 
Other work looks at conditions that appear clearly pathological but where no biological cause is 
known, for example schizophrenia. Some disorders appear to vary radically with social 
environment, for example Multiple Personality Disorder. Some psychiatric research examines 
conditions that are not clearly pathological at all, but that might be normal under certain conditions, 
for example, suicidal thoughts, or hearing voices.  
 
Depending on the type of condition under consideration very different conceptual issues are raised.  
In the case of suicidal thoughts one might worry about the relevance of Donald Davidson’s claims 
that rational thoughts are necessarily holistically connected (Davidson 1970). Maybe this means 
that rational thoughts of suicide will resist reduction, for example. Here we will not get drawn into 
considering the acceptability and implications of Davidson’s claims, but will just note that any such 
concerns could only affect rational thoughts, and would leave work on non-rational mental states, 
such as feelings of panic or nightmares untouched. Other worries specifically concern disorders that 
appear subject to ‘looping effects’, in the sense introduced by Ian Hacking (1995a, 1995b). The 
symptoms of certain disorders appear to be affected by our descriptions of them – so the symptoms 
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of Multiple Personality Disorder have plausibly altered as the media presentations of the condition 
have changed. Disorders that display such effects pose specific problems. Hacking argues that in 
such cases epidemiological studies will make little sense, for example, as the disorder is necessarily 
a moving target that shifts as it is studied. Once again, such worries are specific. Certain conditions 
and certain conditions only can be expected to be affected by such concerns. 
 
Thinking about the diversity of research methods that psychiatrists employ and the range of 
phenomena that they examine makes it plausible that there will not be very much that one can say 
about the standing of psychiatric research in general. If there are conceptual problems with the use 
of certain methods, or with certain types of investigation into certain conditions, then there is no 
need to think that this implies there will be problems with other types of psychiatric research.  
 
5. Demanding high epistemic standards across the board 
 
If we cease to consider the distinction between science and non-science as being of any importance 
we can concentrate instead on more significant questions – such as how we can best find out truths. 
In all areas where people purport to be seeking truths they should be expected to conduct their 
research in epistemically responsible ways. Most obviously this will lead us to demand more from 
research in areas that have been traditionally regarded as non-scientific. For example, at present 
when a philosopher or historian presents figures and discusses trends they can just give tables of 
raw figures (as I do in Cooper 2005, p116, for example). However, we may well decide that 
statistical techniques that are good in fields traditionally regarded scientific are also good elsewhere, 
and demand that all of those who discuss ‘trends’ supply robust evidence that the trends under 
discussion are actually statistically significant. Similarly, the methods of systematic review might 
usefully be employed in disciplines outside the traditional sciences. 
 
However, it’s not only ‘non-scientific’ work from which we should expect more. In the non-
sciences we accept that the epistemic status of many claims depends on the personal integrity of the 
expert in question. So, if we want a builder’s opinion on a job we will typically worry a lot about 
whether the builder we ask is honest. We are more likely to trust someone who we know and with 
whom we are likely to have continued contact, we may ask for multiple quotes and compare them, 




In science, on the other hand, I suggest that the thought that there is a ‘scientific method’ which 
turns raw data into reliable facts has led to a neglect of the question of personal trustworthiness. We 
have a picture whereby the ‘scientific method’ works well regardless of who the researchers are or 
what their interests might be. However the idea that ‘the scientific method’ can operate regardless 
of the personal integrity of researchers should be rejected. Work by historians and sociologists of 
science has shown that it is an essential part of scientific practice that scientists make judgements 
about the trustworthiness of different practitioners. Harry Collins, for example, has provided 
numerous cases where judgements as to whether an experiment has been performed correctly 
ultimately come down to judgements of the personal integrity of the researchers involved (Collins 
1985). Science cannot work unless the scientific community can decide which results to believe and 
so judgements of trustworthiness play an essential role in the enterprise. For those who are 
unconvinced by Collins’ work it is also possible to argue that the allegiances of researchers matters 
more directly: Take the data that is produced by Randomised Controlled Trials in psychiatry. A 
RCT is ‘scientific’, if anything is. However, numerous studies have shown that the results that are 
found by an RCT depend on who is paying the bill. Researchers who are paid by drugs companies 
find results that favour drugs companies (Perlis et al 2005, Baker et al 2003). Here we not need to 
consider the mechanisms via which this occurs, we just need to note that it happens. The fact that 
findings vary with the researchers’ allegiance is sufficient to show that the interests of researchers 
matter. As such, in the same way that we seek out independent advice in non-scientific fields we 
should also expect scientific researchers to be financially disinterested. In non-scientific fields we 
expect that those who review products, for example the people who test kitchen implements for 
consumer magazines, should have no financial incentive to deliver one judgement above another. 
We should extend the same demands to those who test drugs. 
 
6. Why have people wanted to know whether psychiatry is a science? 
  
In this chapter I have argued that the question ‘Is psychiatric research scientific?’ is the wrong 
question to ask. What then accounts for its enduring appeal? I suggest that the attraction of asking 
whether psychiatric research is scientific has two explanations. 
 
First, many people genuinely want to know what to make of psychiatric research. They want to 
know whether psychiatrists should be treated as experts or charlatans. Asking whether such research 
is scientific has been seen as a way of addressing this question. Roughly, if psychiatric research is 
scientific, then, it has been assumed, researchers in psychiatry should have the same expert status as 
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other scientists – their findings will be trustworthy. If psychiatry is only a pseudoscience on the 
other hand, then what research psychiatrists say can be ignored. However, once one considers the 
diversity of psychiatric research and the diversity of the conditions that psychiatrists examine the 
idea that one might reach a conclusion as to whether the whole lot is science (and so presumably 
decent stuff) or pseudoscience (and so presumably not worth listening to) seems laughable. 
Working out whether psychiatric research is empirically and conceptually sound will of necessity 
be a piece-meal and difficult job. 
 
The second reason why asking whether psychiatry is a science has had broad appeal is that it has 
played a key role in the rhetoric associated with boundary drawing (as noted by Still and Dryden 
2004). When two parties wish to dismiss each others claims, for one side to denounce the other as 
‘pseudoscience’ operates as a way of rubbishing particular positions. Thus the whole of psychiatry 
or psychology is denounced as pseudoscience by parties opposed to these disciplines, such as 
scientology. Or, at a finer grain, particular theories within psychology are denounced as 
pseudoscience by theorists who wish to exclude certain researchers. Calling an area pseudoscience 
has acted as a battle-cry. In this chapter, however, I have argued that ‘science’ cannot be defined 
and is not necessarily epistemically superior to ‘non-science’. As such the temptation to praise a 





In this chapter I have argued that ‘science’ is a family resemblance term. Science has no defining 
features and asking whether a field is scientific is a red herring. Instead we should ask more specific 
questions. We need to ask whether the methods used to address specific questions are appropriate. 
The research methods used by psychiatrists are diverse; so too are the conditions that they 
investigate. As such, there is likely to be little that can be said about the epistemology of psychiatry 
in general. The best questions to ask will be very particular. Instead of asking whether psychiatry is 
a science, we should ask questions like ‘Given what we know about schizophrenia does it seem to 
be a natural kind?’ or ‘Might cognitive theories of autism be reduced to theories that posit 
neurological problems?’.  If we want to know which psychiatric claims to believe and how to 
interpret them, there are no short-cuts that can be made. Psychiatric research tackles diverse 
problems in diverse ways and assessing whether it is empirically and conceptually sound will be a 
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